HARDY FORUM ARCHIVE H01018 2/3/01 "ETHELBERTA AND J.S. MILL QUESTION" =========================================================== Date: Sat, 03 Feb 2001 13:54:32 -0500 From: Robert Schweik Subject: Ethelberta Interprets Mill (revised posting) I've been told that on at least one email program my posting "Ethelberta Interprets Mill" appeared with long and short lines--apparently because the lines on my original posting were too long. Here's a revised version with shorter lines: In the course of preparing a study of Hardy's *The Hand of Ethelberta*, I came across a passage and a critical interpretation of it that raised questions I wish to pose to members of the TTHA Forum. In what follows, all references to the novel are to the Macmillan "Wessex" edition text. In Chapter XXXVI, Ethelberta considers the question of whether she should be a schoolmistress or do her family good by marrying Lord Mountclere. Her family has just urged her not to become a schoolmistress (though they do not know she is considering marrying the wealthy and powerful Lord Mountclere). Afterward, in private, she ponders her situation. The extended quote upon which my question is based follows between the horizontal lines. Asterisks indicate my elisions: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------ The ingenious Ethelberta, much more prone than the majority of women to theorize on conduct, felt the need of some soothing defence of the actions involved in any ambiguous course before finally committing herself to it. She took down a well-known treatise on Utilitarianism which she had perused before,and to which she had given her adherence ere any instance had arisen wherein she might wish to take it as a guide. Here she desultorily searched for argument, and found it; but the application of her author's philosophy to the marriage question was an operation of her own, as unjustifiable as it was likely in the circumstances. ' The ultimate end,' she read, ' with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people) is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in quantity and quality. . . . This being, according to the utilitarian opinion the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality. ' It was an open question, so far, whether her own happiness should or should not be preferred to that of others. But that her personal interests were not to be considered as paramount appeared further on:-- ' The happiness which forms the standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.' As to whose happiness was meant by that of ' other people, ' ' all concerned,' and so on, her luminous moralist soon enlightened her:-- ' the occasions on which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale--in other words, to be a public benefactor--are but exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to attend to.' And that these few persons should be those endeared to her by every domestic tie no argument was needed to prove. That their happiness would be in proportion to her own well-doing, and power to remove their risks of indigence, required no proving either to her now. By a sorry but unconscious misapplication of sound and wide reasoning did the active mind of Ethelberta thus find itself a solace. ******************************************************* ******************************************************************** In looking back upon her past as she retired to rest, Ethelberta could almost doubt herself to be the identical woman with her who had entered on a romantic career a few short years ago.' For that doubt she had good reason. She had begun as a poet of the Satanic school in a sweetened form; she was ending as a pseudo-utilitarian. ***** Yet Ethelberta's gradient had been regular: emotional poetry, light verse, romance as an object, romance as a means, thoughts of marriage as an aid to her pursuits, a vow to marry for the good of her family; in other words, from soft and playful Romanticism to distorted Benthamism. Was the moral incline upward or down? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------- Now for my query. Hardy's narrator could scarcely be more emphatic in putting Ethelberta's reasoning in doubt. She searches, we are told, for some "soothing defence"; her application of Mill's argument to her situation was "unjustifiable"; her interpretation of Mill is "a sorry but unconscious misapplication of sound and wide reasoning"; she has become a "pseudo-utilitarian" embracing a "distorted Benthamism." Furthermore, there is a hint of condesension in the narrator's characterizing Ethelberta as feeling "the need of some soothing defence" in which "the active mind of Ethelberta" would "thus find itself a solace." In spite of these comments, one well-known recent critic, Patricia Ingham, flatly asserts that Ethelberta's interpretation is "impeccable logic" and "a triumph of logic" (see her *Thomas Hardy*, Feminist Reading Series (Hemel Hempstead, 1989), p. 37. My questions: What is it in the Mill passages the narrator quotes (or perhaps others omitted by the narrator) that support the judgment that Ethelberta's application of Mill's argument to her situation is unjustifiable and a distortion? Or, alternately, do the quoted passages (or perhaps others omitted by the narrator) serve to reveal to us that Ethelberta's interpretation of Mill is a "triumph of logic" as Patricia Ingham asserts. Do they suggest that Hardy wished us to perceive the narrator as unreliable in making such critical judgments of Ethelberta's reasoning? Bob Schweik ========== From: RPKOAK@aol.com Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 13:14:41 EST Subject: Re: Ethelberta Interprets Mill (revised posting) yes Ethelberta interprets Mill and the dear reader of Hardy's fiction interprets the narrator 'critical' of Ethelberta's reasoning. the narrators 'ideosyncratic regard' is noted by readers giving them 'solace' in their desire to view Ethelberta as heroine- having her own voice and executive power- suffering for others the narrator views us readers as ignorant, willful, impassioned for personal power - monarch 'wannabes' In our desperate social position as women in a male dominated society we see Ethelberta's decision 'triumphant logic' leading her to success in terms of social and economic power and leadership that makes a difference in the lives of people there. so for such heroes and the 'love and sexual experience' they express we buy Hardy's fiction but he warns us that direction leads to autocracy and continued personal oppression - a warning not noticed by us seduced by the 'love and sexual experience' in the text. we are 'overmastered by our passions' naturally. He would have objected to the idea of Monarchy if not to that of Victoria in particular? In which case we view the narrator as reliable which is also most consistent with all Hardy's fiction. but among those who care about the subject it seems that is a minority position but a 'loyal minority' because we wonder what 'mediates' dear readers 'triumphal logic' viewpoint In the narrator there is that criticism of Ethelberta's reasoning but and most important there is also that 'ideosyncratic regard' for Ethelberta the reader loves and thus the regard is for the reader too. (It is also a paternalism ...leading Hardy to a fascist world view? ========== From: RPKOAK@aol.com Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 17:25:41 EST Subject: Re: Ethelberta Interprets Mill (revised posting) "Hardy's narrator could scarcely be more emphatic in putting Ethelberta's reasoning in doubt."but like our favorite academic model the narrator also has an apparent 'regard'- a real hope for the future and eventual transformation of Ethelberta into an emotionally mature student. The narrator sets an example by her criticism mixed with regard based on qualities apparent in Ethelberta ('the student') She needs a 'soothing defense' for whatever reason and she actively seeks that. (it could be that she regrets needing to dismiss the schoolmistress idea) In her disultory or depressed state she searches in Mills text like a student might and the narrator recognizes her stress by describing the result of the emotional state she is in--'a sorry but unconscious misapplication of sound and wide reasoning' The narrator is not doubting her reasoning so much as recognizing her emotional state which makes the 'sound and wide reasoning' right at her fingertips and in the narrators reasoning in the professors reasoning not immediately available to her. so like Mills in his reasoning the narrator is not critical at all but very sympathetic or understanding. thanks for your discussion (she does have new information from outside of her world in the form of the schoolmistress idea and even the latest readings in law, politics and economics . Its a beginning and may require more time before a transformation of the student.) For her immediate delemma Ethelberta searches for some 'soothing defense' ========== From: "Ahmad" Subject: Re: Ethelberta Interprets Mill (revised posting) Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2001 22:17:11 +0200 Ethelberta does not get it right when she applies Mill's *Utilitarianism * to her intention to marry the dissolute sexagenarian Lord Mountclere. First, in altruistically deciding to marry for the good of her brothers and sisters, she does not seem to have taken into consideration the pain that this marriage would bring not only to her herself but also to her family. Secondly, she makes the mistake of presuming to know what is good for them more than they do themselves. Thirdly, she apparently equates the materialistic factors of wealth and position with happiness, which is principally a subjective state of being. The narrator, therefore, is right in describing her as a "pseudo-utilitarian" using "distorted Benthamism." Later, in Chapter XL, Christopher Julian comments: "'. . . I see how it is - she is doing this to benefit her brothers and sisters, if possible; but she ought to know that if she is miserable they will never be happy. That's the nature of women - they take the form for the essence, and that is what she is doing now. . . .'" Suleiman M. Ahmad, University of Damascus. E-mail: < smahmad@mail.sy >. ==========